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What is required to accurately judge another’s epistemic prowess in relation to one’s 
own epistemic position, specifically in cases of disagreement? How do the requirements relate 
to the philosophical dialogue on epistemic peer disagreement? These questions stem from a 
gap in contemporary literature on epistemic disagreement; scholars have, in their writings on 
epistemic peer disagreement, largely overlooked the question of how one is able to accurately 
evaluate whether they are engaged in a certain kind of epistemic disagreement (peer or other).  
This paper will argue that a proper evaluation of the epistemic status of another person 
in relation to oneself presupposes the possession of the relevant subset of intellectual virtues, 
referred to as “p-virtues” throughout the rest of the work. A summation of the claim I am making 
is as follows: If person S believes the claim P and S believes that another person, S1, believes 
the claim not- P, S knows (or has a justified belief about) the evidential value they have to 
accord to S1's disagreement "only if" S has p-virtues.  
What, then, are these p-virtues? Further why are they essential to one’s ability to know 
or be justified in forming a belief about one’s epistemic disagreement with another? Testimonial 
justice (to borrow Fricker’s term1), and intellectual humility will be argued to be among such 
virtues. Section one will advance the introduction of intellectual virtues in the debate on the 
epistemology of disagreement. Sections two and three will explicate testimonial justice and 
humility as intellectual virtues which are also p-virtues. In section four, a common understanding 
of these p-virtues will be invoked to shed light on what precisely is occurring when a lack of p-
virtues leads one to misevaluate an epistemic situation, and what harm is associated with this 
mistake. The concluding section will briefly reflect on the broader significance of the thesis of 
this paper. 
1 Fricker, 2007.  
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I. Peer Disagreement & Epistemic Evaluations: 
 The field of peer disagreement in epistemology is both fascinating and rapidly 
expanding. Before it can be explored, a working definition of epistemic peers is necessary. 
Individuals are considered epistemic peers when neither of them enjoys an advantage nor 
suffers from a disadvantage with regards to their knowledge of the evidence and arguments 
pertaining to a disagreement, nor stands on unequal footing with regards to cognitive ability or 
virtues/vices. If cognitive/evidential advantages, inequalities, or other relevant differences are 
present, then the parties involved are divided as epistemic inferiors and superiors. 
The question at the heart of this field is this: what is the rational response to 
disagreement with an epistemic peer? This question looms over and, to a large degree, shapes 
the writing on peer disagreement. There are numerous other queries and directions, which have 
been or are being explored due to their relation to the primary question. There is, however, a 
distinct but related question: what qualities or characteristics allow one to accurately judge 
another as an epistemic inferior, peer, or superior?  This question is of great import; since to 
reach a stage where the primary question becomes epistemically relevant to one’s 
disagreement, one must first be able to establish if any particular disagreement is a case of 
disagreement with an epistemic inferior, peer, or superior.  
 This final question, which I will refer to as ‘p-question,’ is what sparked the thesis of this 
work: that there are certain virtues, p-virtues, that must be possessed in order to accurately 
assess any given disagreement and assign it to one of the three categories. The p-question 
seems to have been largely overlooked by the literature on peer disagreement, and the 
explanatory gap must be filled in order for the answers to broader questions to become useful. If 
one cannot reliably establish who is an epistemic inferior, peer, or superior, then one greatly 
reduces the probability that they will respond rationally to a disagreement, even if they 
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possesses the correct answer to the primary question. I will continue on now to establish two 
examples of p-virtues.  
 
II. Testimonial Justice:  
 Testimonial justice will be defined as the negation of testimonial injustice, so it is with the 
latter concept that I will begin.  First, the context of this particular kind of epistemic injustice 
(testimonial injustice is here thought to be a subset of epistemic injustice) is that there is a 
situation where a speaker and would be knower attempts to tell a hearer something, and thus 
transmit knowledge. “. . .the central case of testimonial injustice is identity-prejudicial credibility 
deficit”2.The two primary components of this definition of testimonial injustice are that it stems 
from one’s prejudices against certain perceived identities, and that this prejudice is used by the 
hearer to justify giving the speaker lessened credibility as a knower. The hearer’s reliance on 
identity prejudices which result in affording the speaker a lowered credibility is an example of 
identity power. Using the example of race as a social identity, one can identify testimonial 
injustice occurring against (in one of many possible examples) certain racial minorities who are 
stereotyped as being poorly raised, less naturally intelligent, and therefore less credible as 
knowers3. This kind of persistent testimonial injustice degrades its subject due to the warped 
perspective of the hearer. 
The result of testimonial injustice is that the would be knower suffers what Fricker calls a 
primary harm: a harm which damages “. . . a capacity essential to human value”.4 Fricker claims 
2 Fricker, pp. 28, 2007.  
3Stereotypes are defined by Fricker neutrally and simply as a widely held association between a given 
social group and one or more attribute. Further, neutrally defined stereotypes can be seen as unavoidable 
and often useful heuristics in everyday epistemic situations. However the focus of this work is on negative 
and prejudiced stereotypes which, as pre-judgements, harm the social group in question as knowers by 
reinforcing unreliable or unfounded empirical generalizations.  
4The distinction and details of primary versus secondary harms will not be discussed here; Fricker, pp.44, 
2007.  
                                               
4 
 
that being a knower and capable of freely putting forth ideas into social discourse is a 
fundamental aspect of being a human, and I concur. Being harmed as a knower damages this 
essentially human aspect of a person. Framing the harm this way allows one to see testimonial 
injustice as not just an epistemic detriment, but a powerful tool of oppression which silences 
voices of those who are already forced into characteristically inaccurate and unfair social 
identities. As Fricker states, the primary harm of this injustice is to undermine the very humanity 
of the speaker by restricting a basic human freedom and treating them as less than. 
Testimonial justice as a virtue is thought in this work to be the negation of testimonial 
injustice; it is the virtue of neutralizing the epistemically harmful prejudices and resulting 
credibility deficit that accompany testimonial injustice. The intellectual virtue of testimonial 
justice comes first from a habitual and conscientious recognition of the existence of negative 
and systematic prejudices, and then proceeding to counter the credibility deficits that stem from 
this epistemic injustice by giving additional weight and regard to a speaker whose perceived 
identity normally results in their being shackled with a credibility deficit. Possessing this virtue is 
crucial to accurately assessing one’s epistemic position to another in the case of a 
disagreement, as without it (or if one possesses the vice of testimonial injustice) one will likely 
handout credibility deficits that are not related to the speaker’s epistemic competence. The 
implications of testimonial justice with regards to disagreement will be further fleshed out in the 
section IV of this work. For now, an account of intellectual humility needs to be given.  
 
III. Intellectual Humility: 
The definition of the virtue of intellectual humility is contested by scholars, so it will serve 
this work to briefly outline a few competing views in order to reveal the relevant implications of 
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each. Robert and Wood, in their work Intellectual Virtues5, extract an idea of intellectual humility 
as it relates to corresponding vices like vanity and arrogance. Julia Driver6 gives an account of 
modesty, which is taken to be correlative to humility, in which one must purposely 
underestimate and undervalue their own worth. Contrastingly, Garcia7 offers a definition which 
concentrates on the moral as opposed to intellectual virtue of humility, so it must be translated 
into one which is intellectual for the purpose of this work. Finally, I will divide up these theories 
into two broad categories in order to distinguish how they relate to and support the thesis on the 
p-virtues needed by a person to properly assess disagreements.  
When illuminated by the vice of intellectual vanity, Roberts and Wood take humility to be 
a virtue exhibited when a person is generally unconcerned or inattentive to their intellectual 
value or status. Crucially, this does not entail an ignorance or mistaken perception of the 
person’s worth; they are not deluded about their worth, they are apathetic to it. The intellectually 
vain person would be overly concerned with how they appeared to others, and how their status 
and worth is perceived by others.  
The vice of intellectual arrogance is said by Roberts and Wood to lay in a person’s 
disposition to feel entitled to make extravagant intellectual claims due to the person’s inflated 
view of themselves. An intellectually arrogant person sees themselves as superior or more 
excellent in terms of their thinking, and uses this self-perception as justification to overstep the 
proper intellectual bounds that are set by an accurate view of their intellectual prowess. Using 
arrogance as the background for a definition of the virtue of humility, Roberts and Wood say that 
the virtue is “. . .a disposition not to make unwarranted intellectual entitlement claims on the 
basis of one’s (supposed) superiority or excellence. . .”8. Repeating the process of drawing 
5 Roberts and Wood, 2007.  
6 Driver, 1999. 
7 Garcia, 2006. 
8 Roberts and Wood, pp. 250, 2007.  
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humility’s definition from a possible opposing vice, intellectual humility here concerns itself not 
with how others perceive the person in question, but with the self-perception of the individual. 
Further, it is this accurate self-perception and then making of appropriate intellectual claims that 
characterize humility when opposed to arrogance.  
Roberts and Wood pull together their various accounts of intellectual humility to offer the 
following definition: “. . . it is an unusually low dispositional concern for the kind of self-
importance that accrues to persons who are viewed by their intellectual communities as 
talented, accomplished, and skilled. . .”9. Intellectual humility is the habit of a person who has an 
accurate evaluation of their own intellectual skills and virtues to pay little attention or mind to 
their talents and the like, and not to overestimate the bounds or reach they are entitled to make 
in terms of intellectual claims upon the consideration of an accurate self-assessment.  
Epistemic modesty, not intellectual humility, is the subject of Driver’s writing. However 
this paper will use her account and discuss it as if it is interchangeable with one of intellectual 
humility, and examine it as such. The primary features of her definition of modesty are a kind of 
limited ignorance and an inaccurate view of oneself. Self-deception and controlled ignorance 
are valued by her as tools that lead one to have the intellectual virtue of modesty; she calls this 
theory an underestimation account. She discusses several versions of the above view, and 
settles on the following as being the most defensible and accurate: “Combination modesty (CM) 
is when an agent is modest if he is disposed to underestimate self-worth to some limited extent, 
even in spite of the available evidence”10. Emphasis on the “limited” and “controlled” degree of 
ignorance being purported by Driver shows her recognition of the oddity of supporting an 
account that involves not only self-deception, but the valuing of ignorance. She examines 
9 Roberts and Wood, pp. 250, 2007. 
10 Driver, pp.830, 1999.  
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several counter arguments and finds reason to maintain the view above; I will not delve into 
these here, but instead continue on to the final account of humility. 
The title of Garcia’s writing, Being Unimpressed With Ourselves: Reconceiving 
Humility11, offers a highly condensed view of her theory of humility as a moral virtue. It most 
significantly involves, in an abbreviated sense, being duly unimpressed with oneself. Details 
arise as she goes on to prescribe a kind of humility where, “The humble are those who are 
unimpressed with their own admired or envied features (or admirable or enviable ones), those 
who assign little prominence to their possession of characteristics in which they instead might 
well take pride”12. According to Garcia, one relevant distinction between her theory and others is 
the inward focus it contains; it is a view in which what is important is self-perception, self-
evaluation, and one’s reactions to these. This is said by her to oppose outwardly directed 
theories of humility that center on one’s interactions and reactions to others’ perceptions or 
assessments. She classifies Roberts and Wood’s brand of humility as belonging to the latter 
category, and critiques their view as exhibiting possible but not necessary conditions for 
humility. It seems that if we amend her definition to focus on only characteristics which are 
strongly connected to garnering epistemic goods or traditional intellectual virtues or skills, then 
we can see her theory as one of intellectual instead of purely moral humility.  
 A useful division of the three theories of humility (or modesty) discussed is to label them 
as either promoting an accurate view or belief about one’s epistemic capacity or an inaccurate 
one. Driver’s underestimation account advocates for one to have inaccurate beliefs about 
themselves, where Garcia’s and Roberts and Wood’s promote accurate self-assessment. 
Categorizing these theories as such allows for clarification of humility’s role as a p-virtue. 
Inaccurate theories of humility leave room for error in one’s assessment of others in the context 
11 Garcia, 2006. 
12 Garcia, pp.417, 2006. 
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of disagreement. If one has inaccurate beliefs about their own intellectual worth or value, they 
will be more likely to misconstrue their epistemic position in contrast to the person they are 
disagreeing with. One may falsely take an epistemic inferior to be a peer, or a peer to be a 
superior; either way this misconstruing of the other because of inaccurate beliefs will impact 
one’s reaction to the disagreement and cause them to engage improperly with the other. 
Theories of humility in which one does have accurate beliefs will negate these possible 
mistakes (or at least greatly decrease the chance of them being made), and so allow one to 
take the proper action in response to disagreement (whether it be an epistemic inferior, peer, or 
superior). Thus, accurate beliefs of oneself are essential to forming accurate beliefs about the 
nature of the disagreement and so facilitate an appropriate reaction to the disagreement.   
 
V. Epistemic Trustworthiness & Harm: 
 What exactly is happening when one misjudges another on the basis of some vice or 
lack of corresponding virtue? If one misjudges another’s epistemic prowess, they have 
essentially assigned a false value to their degree of epistemic trustworthiness. Borrowing from 
Fricker, I take this trustworthiness to consist of the dual elements of competence and sincerity13. 
Misjudging as the result of a lack of humility or the presence of testimonial injustice has a 
profound impact. A lack of humility, for instance, may allow one to consider themselves superior 
to another who is actually their peer; if this is the case, they may refuse to treat the other as a 
knower who is capable of transmitting knowledge to themselves or others, and so harm this 
fundamentally human aspect of other. This misjudging of the self further blocks one from 
reacting properly to the disagreement at hand.  
13 Fricker, pp. 45, 2007.  
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Misjudgment may also come in the form of misjudging the other by exhibiting the vice of 
testimonial injustice. Here one would, using again an example of genuine peer disagreement, 
take the other to be inferior but this time because one’s judgement is distorted with regards to 
the other’s abilities and epistemic powers. An accessible and socially relevant example of this 
would be if one doles out a credibility deficit to the other on the basis of the other’s dark skin 
color. Again a misjudgment has occurred, but this time with regards to one’s underestimating 
the other. Such a mistake can dramatically impact the other, who may be discouraged or lose 
epistemic confidence due to one’s judging them inferior, when in reality the basis for one’s 
judgement is a character flaw and not reflective of the other’s epistemic abilities.  
In either case, one’s inaccurate assessment of the other’s epistemic trustworthiness 
causes one to do them wrong, on both an epistemic and human level. Further, these kinds of 
inaccurate judgements may reflect larger social issues and should be pointed out and corrected 
whenever possible.  
 
Conclusion:  
It can now be seen that possessing the relevant set of intellectual virtues is needed to 
combat the various kinds of harms that spring from epistemic miscalculations. The virtue of 
testimonial justice is needed to negate the kind of prejudicial credibility deficits that stem from its 
paralleling vice, testimonial injustice. Humility is needed to counteract the hubris that leads one 
to mistakenly have an inflated view of their own epistemic position.  
Moving from epistemic evaluation of another person to the consideration of epistemic 
disagreements and the proper reaction of both parties in the face of varying kinds of 
disagreement, a fact becomes salient. Without the p-virtues which include humility, testimonial 
justice, and possibly others, one cannot know or have a justified belief regarding the evidential 
value they should afford another person’s disagreement with them where they hold the belief 
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that P, and the other person (S1) holds that not-P is true. This is because the lack of p-virtues 
allows for the fact that one’s response to a disagreement may be suffering from an over-rated 
self-evaluation or an identity-prejudicial credibility deficit, and one may be reacting 
inappropriately. It is only with the possession of p-virtues that one can be said to know what 
evidential value to attribute to a disagreement and react accordingly. The lack of p-virtues rules 
out one as knowing how to rationally react to disagreement because there is every chance that, 
whatever their reaction, they would be reacting to an illusion based on ego, harmful prejudices, 
or both.  
Where does my thesis reside in the broader context of contemporary epistemology? It 
belongs to the burgeoning literature that seeks to establish theoretically illuminating connections 
between social epistemology and virtue epistemology. The cross fertilization of these sub-fields 
can be seen in other work by Fricker, where she develops arguments on institutional virtues14. 
Writing of this kind, which utilizes the explanatory ability of theories and terms in the discussed 
sub-fields, can reveal new ways of understanding relevant social, moral, and epistemic issues. 
I do not imagine that humility and testimonial justice encompass all p-virtues, however, 
they seem to play a significant role in allowing us to accurately judge ourselves and others 
epistemically. One’s ability to recognize how socially constructed and enforced prejudices form 
unjust power structures which manifest (at least in one way) as epistemic injustices is vital to 
breaking down said power structures. I look forward to further exploration of these p-virtues and 
examining other potential factors like intellectual courage and flexibility that shed light on the 





14 Fricker, 2010.  
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